We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthrough rates which lead to two natural posted-price benchmarks. In one benchmark, the winning advertisers are charged the same price per click, and in the other, the product of the price per click and the advertiser clickability (which can be thought of as the probability an advertisement is clicked if it has been seen) is the same for all winning advertisers. We adapt the random sampling auction from [10] to the sponsored search setting and improve the analysis from [1], to show a high competitive ratio for two truthful auctions, each with respect to one of the two described benchmarks.
INTRODUCTION

Problem and motivation
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tions have been receiving recent attention [22, 15, 7] . The efficient auction in this setting, namely VCG [24, 5, 11, 6, 18] , and the current mechanism used for sponsored search, namely GSP [6, 23] (of which the VCG outcome is an equilibrium [6] ), do not provide revenue guarantees. In fact, the revenue from VCG can be arbitrarily bad compared to the optimal revenue with full knowledge of bidder valuations, as the footnote shows 1 . Our simulations indicate that the revenue from the VCG outcome can be particularly small in less competitive yet realistic markets, where there are not many bidders with similar values for the keyword.
Can we ensure revenue guarantees even in markets with less competition? The metric we use to gauge the performance of an auction is to compare its revenue with the revenue that could be raised by an optimal omniscient posted price auction (the auction that raises the optimal revenue if the auctioneer knows the true valuations of all the bidders and charges every bidder the same price). The competitive ratio is the worst case ratio, over all possible inputs, between the revenue of an optimal omniscient posted price auction and the revenue of the proposed auction.
The main challenge in applying competitive analysis to our setting is to incorporate the existence of multiple posted price benchmarks arising from the structure of clickthrough rates. As in [6, 2] , we model clickthrough rates as separable, i.e., the probability that a particular ad in a particular slot is clicked can be broken down into two probabilities. First is the slot-clickability, which can be thought of as the probability that the user will look at the displayed advertisement (the higher the slot placement, the more likely it is that the user will see the ad). The second is the ad-clickability, which can be thought of as the bidder dependent probability that the advertisement will be clicked, given that it has been seen. We describe our model formally in §2. While the basic component of our mechanism is a random sampling auction as in [10] , there are now two natural posted-price benchmarks depending on whether or not advertisers are discounted for their clickabilities: the optimal omniscient single-price revenue where all winning advertisers must be charged the same price per click, and the optimal omniscient 'weighted-price' revenue, where all winning advertisers are charged the same price per sighting, i.e., the product of price per click and ad-clickability is the same for all winning advertisers. These two benchmarks are the natural posted-price analogs of two charging schemes that have been used in practice: charge an advertiser the bid-per-click of the bidder below him, or discount the bidder proportional to his ad-clickability, i.e., divide the bid per click of the advertiser below by the adclickability of the bidder being charged.
Although our work is motivated by sponsored search, it is also applicable in other settings where the probability of a successful event is the product of the probability of two separate events: one event based on factors that depend on the allocation, and the other event based on bidder dependent factors. For example, an airport manger may want to auction off a set of vendor sites. One event is that a potential customer walks past a site, and this event depends on the particular location of the site within the airport (i.e. the allocation). The other event is that the potential customer walking past the site will actually enter the site, and this event depends on factors related to the bidder occupying the site such as attractiveness of the site and brand familiarity.
Results
The main contribution of our paper is a mechanism with a Nash equilibrium that raises revenue that is competitive against both the single price and weighted price benchmarks. To do this, we first adapt the random sampling auction to obtain two auctions, each with high revenue guarantees against one of the two benchmarks. The contribution here is improving an existing analysis of the random sampling auction by a factor 2, in addition to an analysis of the random sampling approach in the sponsored setting, accounting for advertiser and slot clickabilities.
The two random sampling auctions are then used as building blocks for a single auction with Nash equilibria that raises revenue at least as large as that raised by each of the two random sampling auctions independently; further, if bidders bid their true value whenever that belongs to the set of utility maximizing strategies, every Nash equilibrium of the auction raises this high revenue. This is significant for the following reason. As we show in Section 3, either of these two benchmarks can be larger than the other: the optimal weighted price revenue can be as small as a factor O(log k) of the optimal single price revenue, and the optimal single price revenue can be as small as a factor 1/k of the optimal weighted price revenue (in fact, the cases where these bounds are tight are when the larger revenue is actually the optimal multiprice revenue). In addition, which benchmark is larger cannot be determined without knowing the private values of the bidders. One significant challenge in designing an auction competitive against both benchmarks is that the same bidders participate in both auctions and can have higher utility in one or the other. Despite the presence of such bidders, we find that there is a way to always raise revenue competitive with both benchmarks. While the auction is no longer truthful, every Nash equilibrium of the auction has this competitive property.
We also perform numerical simulations to compare the performance of our auction against that of the VCG auction. In crowded markets with a large amount of competition, both auctions achieve a large fraction of the optimal revenue, and the VCG auction obtains more revenue than the competitive auction. However, as the market becomes less competitive and both auctions achieve a smaller fraction of the optimal revenue, the competitive auction overtakes the VCG auction. Our findings that the competitive auction produces more revenue than the VCG alternative in more challenging situations (i.e., less competitive markets) is in keeping with our analytical framework, as competitive auctions are designed to perform well in worst case settings.
Related work
Incentive compatible auctions for allocation and pricing in the keyword search setting have been considered previously. In [6] , the authors show that any equilibrium using generalized second pricing (i.e., where an advertiser is charged the next highest bid), has revenue at least that of the VCG [24, 5, 11] auction. Another approach [2] , gives a truthful pricing mechanism when the allocation of slots is externally specified.
There has also been previous work on auctions that maximize revenue. The classical work of Myerson [20, 18] on optimal auction design shows how to design an auction that maximizes the expected revenue of the seller when the bidder values are drawn from a (known) continuous distribution. The expectation of revenue is over this known distribution. In contrast, we are interested in maximizing revenue in the worst case scenario, i.e., for every possible vector of bid values.
There has been recent work concerned with revenue in the context of sponsored search. Roughgarden and Sundararajan show that in the classical Bayesian setting studied by Myerson [20] , the VCG mechanism can be made to obtain high revenue by adding enough bidders, i.e., in more competitive markets. Edelman and Schwarz [7] explore setting reserve prices to increase revenues. The work in [15] studies how to use ad-clickabilities in ranking and pricing to improve revenue. All of these differ from our work in that they do not provide worst case revenue guarantees over all realizations of bidder values.
In terms of competitive analysis for auctions, the random sampling approach was first proposed in [10] , and has since been used in several problems and contexts, see for example [16, 4, 12] . Finally, there are several papers that combine multiple auctions into a single auction [3, 19, 1] . In [3] , the generalized auction uses two successive auctions to create an auction that is truthful while maintaining the competitive ratio. Unfortunately, this composition does not apply in our context.
MODEL
Our model is the following. There are n bidders competing for k slots. Each bidder has a private valuation for a click, vi. We order bidders by value, i.e., v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Every slot-bidder pair has a clickthrough rate cij associated with it, which is the probability with which the advertisement of bidder i in slot j is clicked. We assume that this clickthrough rate is separable, i.e., cij = µiθj, where we refer to µi as the ad-clickability of bidder i, and θj as the slot-clickability of slot j. The separability assumption is equivalent to saying that the events of clicking on a particular ad (regardless of which slot it is displayed in) and a particular slot (regardless of which ad is displayed in it) are independent. Although this assumption is not always entirely accurate, analysis shows it is often reasonable [25] , and it has been widely adopted in the literature [2, 6, 17, 21, 14] . We assume that the ad-clickabilities µi and slotclickabilities θi are public knowledge. For our results in §4, we only need µi and θi to be known to the seller (in fact, this is true for all auctions where truthfulness is a dominant strategy), which is a realistic assumption.
We assume that the clickabilities of the slots decrease with position, i.e., θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ . . . ≥ θ k . We define
i.e., Θi is the sum of the clickabilities of the top i slots. We denote by bi the bid of bidder i, and the price charged to bidder i in an allocation by pi. The auction mechanism takes the bids bi, and computes an allocation x and pricing p, where xi = j if the bidder is assigned to slot j, and is 0 if bidder i is not assigned a slot, and pi is the price that bidder i pays per click he receives in his slot.
For a bidder i, we define
which is the expected value to the bidder from a slot with clickability θj = 1. By the separability assumption, the expected value to bidder i in a slot with clickability θj is wiθj.
OPTIMUM PRICING SOLUTIONS
The previous work on digital goods auctions uses as a benchmark the optimal multi-price and optimal single price revenues [12, 10, 1] . In this section, we extend these concepts to our problem, introducing a new benchmark, optimal weighted price revenue, and bound these benchmarks against each other. While current auctions do not sell clicks in different slots at the same price, a single price (or single weighted price) per click is still meaningful when interpreted as a common reserve price for all slots (note that an advertiser's net payment still depends on the clickthrough rate in the assigned slot even if the price-per-click is the same in all slots). Definition 1. Multi-price optimal (OP TMP ): The multiprice optimal revenue, OP TMP , is the maximum possible revenue that can be extracted with k slots, when the true values of all bidders are known. Let w i(j) denote the jth largest value in w, then
We denote by OM the set of bidders that are assigned slots in this allocation.
Definition 2. Single price optimal (OP TSP ): The single price optimal revenue OP TSP is the maximum revenue that can be extracted with k slots, when the true values of all bidders are known, and every bidder assigned to a slot must be charged the same price per click. Here p ≤ k items are sold at a single price vp, where the single price is chosen to maximize revenue. Let µ p i(j) be the jth largest µi of bidders with values vi ≥ vp. Then, OP TSP is computed as
We denote the set of bidders contributing positive revenue to OP TSP as OS.
Unlike in settings without ad-clickabilities, the optimal single price here is not necessarily limited to one of the values v1, . . . , v k -the optimal single price can be any of the values v1, . . . , vn. (If vi ≥ vj implies µi ≥ µj, however, vp is clearly greater equal v k ).
Definition 3. Weighted price optimal (OP TW P ): The weighted price optimal revenue OP TW P is the maximum revenue that can be extracted with k slots, when the true values of all bidders are known, and every bidder assigned to a slot is charged a price inversely proportional to his clickability, i.e., such that piµi is constant. OP TW P is computed as follows: sort the w in decreasing order, and choose an index r ≤ k that maximizes the revenue when every bidder with wi ≥ wr contributes wr to the revenue, i.e.,
Every bidder who is allocated a slot pays a price
We denote the set of bidders contributing positive revenue to OP TW P as OW .
Note that when all ad-clickabilities µi are equal, the weighted price and single price revenues are exactly the same.
We will sometimes use OP TW P (S) and OP TSP (S) to denote the optimal weighted price and single price revenues for a set of bidders S.
The OP T MW P benchmark, that weights prices proportional to ad-clickabilities, is attractive for several reasons. It seems natural to give a discount to bidders that bring the auction most value; this is the prominent framework in both theory (VCG, GSP, and the laddered auction) and in practice (Google and soon Yahoo! charge bidders proportional to ad-clickabilities). In addition, Theorems 4 and 5 show that OP TMP is at most H k times as large as OP TW P , as opposed to k times as large as OP TSP . We also point out that when |OS| = |OW |, then the competitive ratio against OP TSP is worse than the competitive ratio against OP TW P .
But a further examination of Theorem 2 indicates that, in fact, weighted prices are not clearly superior to charging a single price. As we would anticipate, in practice it is often the case that value and ad-clickability are correlated, since the ultimate goal is to match the searcher with a relevant advertisement. We can think of the ad-clickability and the value as both being increasing functions of the quality of the searcher-advertisement match. Since in this case we always have OP TSP ≥ OP TW P , it is quite common for single prices to provide better revenue than weighted prices.
Relating OP TSP and OP TW P
Either OP TSP or OP TW P can be larger, depending on the values of (v, µ) and θ, as the following example shows. Suppose θi = 1 for all slots, and bidders clickabilities are µ1 = 12, µ2 = 6, µ3 = 4, mu4 = 3. If the bidders valuations are v = (1, 1, 1, 1), then OP TSP = 25, and OP TW P = 12. However if the values are v = (1/12, 1/6, 1/4, 1/3), then OP TSP = 13/6 which is less than OP TW P = 4. Notice that which of OP TSP and OP TW P has larger revenue cannot be determined without knowing the true valuations of the bidders.
We now show some theoretical results about how OP TSP and OP TW P are related. Theorem 1. The optimal single price and weighted price revenue are related as follows:
Proof. The first inequality is easy:
where r is the index chosen by OP TW P as before. The same example that shows that OP TMP can be as large as k times OP TSP also shows that this inequality is tight, since OP TW P = OP TMP for that example.
To show the second inequality, consider the set of bidders in OS each of whom pays the optimal single price vp. Consider a modified set of biddersÕS obtained by changing the values of bidders in OS to vi = vp. The value of OP TSP for this set of bidders is unchanged. Now consider the optimal weighted price revenue that we can obtain from OW , which is certainly less than or equal to OP TW P : first, since vi ≤ vi, wi is less equal wi, so the optimal weighted price revenue for the bidders in OW is less equal that for the bidders in OS. Next, we are considering a subset of the set of all bidders used to compute OP TW P , so the revenue cannot increase.
Let r be the number of bidders in the optimal weighted price solution for this modified subset of bidders, and let OP T W P = wrΘr denote this revenue. Then, for all bidders in OP ,
where the third line uses the same argument as in Theorem 5, and H k is the harmonic sum as before. This bound is tight, as shown by the following example. Let there be n = k bidders each with value vi = 1, clickabity µi = kµ/i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and
This theorem showed that either of OP TSP or OP TW P can be larger than the other; OP TSP can be smaller by a factor k, while it can only be larger by a factor O(log k) than OP TW P . While it might still be tempting to choose the weighted price revenue as our benchmark, the next result shows that in the important case when bidders' clickabilities decrease with their values, OP TSP is always greater equal OP TW P .
Theorem 2. Suppose clickabilities decrease with values, i.e., vi ≥ vj implies µi ≥ µj. Then, the optimal single price revenue is greater equal the optimal weighted price revenue.
Proof. Let p be the optimal index in the single price auction; then, since the µ are decreasing with v (i.e., µ i(j) = µj), the revenue is
In the weighted price auction, we order the bidders by wi = viµi, which, by assumption, is the same as the ordering of the v's. Let r be the optimal index picked by the weighted price auction. Then, we extract revenue wrθj = vrµrθj from the bidder assigned to slot j. So the revenue is
where the first inequality follows since µi ≥ µr for i ≤ r, and the second follows from the definition of single price optimum.
Note that it cannot be argued that if v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn and µ1 ≤ . . . ≤ µn, then OP TW P is always larger than OP TSP , since the ordering of bidders according to w and the ordering according to v can be unrelated.
Finally we show that OP TSP and OP TW P are close to each other when the clickbilities of winning bidders are not very different.
Theorem 3. Let µmax and µmin be the largest and smallest clickabilities of bidders in OS ∪ OW .Then µmin µmax OP TW P ≤ OP TSP ≤ µmax µmin OP TW P .
Proof. To show the first inequality, consider the set of bidders in OW , i.e., the bidders who contribute positive revenue to
The smallest value of bidders in OW is at least wr µmax . Therefore, by definition of OP TSP ,
Next we show the second inequality.
where the last inequality uses the fact that for every bidder in OS,
since by defintion, vp is the smallest value of bidders in OS,and µmin is less equal the smallest clickability of these bidders.
Bounding Against OP TMP
We now relate OP TW P and OP TSP to OP TMP . Note that while the worst case bounds for both benchmarks are large, the results in Theorem 3 and 4 show that when the top k bidders values for slots is not very widely different, these benchmarks are quite close to OP TMP . Theorem 4. OP TMP ≤ kOP TSP , and this bound is tight.
Proof. From (2) and (3),
since the θjs are decreasing. To show that this bound is tight, consider the following example. Suppose there are n = k bidders, with vj = 1/c j−1 , and µj = 1/vj = c j−1 , where c is a large positive constant. All slots have equal clickability θj = 1. Then OP TMP = k.
For any choice vi of single price, the revenue is
which approaches 1 for large c.
However, when clickthrough rates are bidder independent (i.e., µi = 1), the optimal single-price revenue can be no smaller than a factor O(log k) of the optimal multi-price revenue. This follows directly from the next result since in this case OP TW P = OP TSP .
. This bound is tight.
Proof. Let r = |OW | be the number of slots sold by OP TW P . From (4) and (1), for j = 1, . . . , k,
So the optimal multi-price revenue, OP TMP , is
where the last inequality follows from the fact that jθj ≤ j i=1 θi, since the θs are decreasing. When all θ and all µ are equal to 1 and vi = 1 i , all inequalities are tight, so this bound is tight as well.
While these theorems show that OP TSP and OP TW P can be quite small compared to the multiprice optimal, when bidders' valuations are more consistent, OP TSP and OP TW P are quite close to OP TMP , as shown in the following theorems.
Theorem 6. Let vmax be the largest, and vmin be the smallest value of the bidders contributing to OP TMP . Then OP TMP ≤ (vmax/vmin) OP TSP .
Proof. We have, with
where the last inequality follows from the definition of OP TSP , since every bidder in OM has value greater equal vmin.
Note here that vmax and vmin are values from OP TMP , and need not be the largest and smallest values from the entire set of bidders (i.e., not necessarily v1 and vn).
A nearly identical argument can be used to show Theorem 7. Let wmax be the largest, and wmin be the smallest revenues of the bidders contributing to OP TMP . Then OP TMP ≤ (wmax/wmin) OP TW P .
AUCTIONS COMPETITIVE AGAINST A SINGLE BENCHMARK
In this section we describe two truthful auctions that are competitive against the optimal single price and weighted price revenues. The auctions in this section are based on the random sampling auction from [10] . However, extending previous analyses gives us a competitive ratio that approaches 2 against the optimum weighted price revenue and 4 against the optimum single price revenue. First we improve upon the analysis in [1] by a factor 2, to obtain a competitive ratio that also approaches 2 against the optimum single price revenue. Next, we incorporate decreasing slot-clickabilities into our analysis to further improve our guarantees to approach near optimal, as the steepness in clickthrough rates increases.
The two competitive auctions use versions of P rof itExtract from [10] that are described in the Appendix. Given a set of bidders S and a revenue R, P rof itExtract R W P is an incentive compatible auction that extracts revenue R using weighted pricing, if OP TW P (S) ≥ R. Given a set of bidders S and a revenue R, P rof itExtract R SP is an incentive compatible auction that extracts revenue R using single pricing, when possible. Unlike P rof itExtractW P , this auction assigns higher slots to bidders whose ads have higher clickabilities.
Mechanism competitive with OP TW P
Now we give an auction mechanism MW P which has high competitive ratio (less equal 4 and asymptotically optimal as a function of bidder dominance and slot clickabilities) with respect to OP TW P .
Mechanism MW P 1. Partition bidders independently and uniformly at random into two subsets S1 and S2.
2. Compute R1 = OP TW P (S1)− , and R2 = OP TW P (S2)+ .
3. Run P rof itExtract
W P on the bidders in S2, and P rof itExtract R 2 W P with the bidders in S1.
We assume that revenues are calculated to some finite precision, and we choose > 0 to be small compared with this precision.
A straightforward application of the analysis from [10] provides at most a guarantee of two, because the revenue extracted is the lesser of the random division of contributions to the optimum. Our setting has a unique structure which allows us to improve upon this guarantee: clickthrough rates are decreasing with respect to rank. The performance of MW P depends on the bidder dominance with respect to participants (i.e., the inverse of the number of participants), and the drop-off rate of the slot-clickabilities. We show that the revenue from MW P is at least a factor 1/4 of OP TW P , and approaches optimal as the bidder dominance decreases and the drop-off in slot-clickabilities becomes steep:
Theorem 8. MW P is truthful, and has competitive ratio βW P =θ r g(αW P )θ r/2 with respect to OP T 2 W P (the optimal weighted price auction selling at least two items), where g(αW P ) ≥ 1/4, and g(αW P ) → 1/2 as αW P → 0.
Hereθm =
Θm m is the average clickability for the top m slots. (Since the θs are decreasing,θm decreases as m increases, i.e., as we average over more slots.) The bidder dominance, αW P , is defined as
where r = |OW | is the number of slots sold in OP TW P . The function g(x) is defined in (5) from the Appendix, and lies between 1/4 and 1/2 for x ≤ 1/2. The value of βW P is roughly the product of two values: one value starts at 2 and tends to 1 as the number of bidders in the optimum solution increases, the other value is the sum of all slot clickabilities, divided by the sum of the largest half of the slot clickabilities, and always lies between 1 and 2.
Mechanism competitive with OP TSP
Next we describe and analyze a mechanism which is competitive with respect to OP TSP . An application of previous results [1, 10] gives an auction that approaches a competitive ratio of 4 as the bidder dominance decreases. We give a new proof that tightens previous analysis and allows us to achieve a competitive ratio of 2 (this also improves on the results in [1] ). We define bidder dominance in the context of single price, to be the largest advertiser clickability in the optimum solution divided by the sum of advertiser clickabilities in the optimum solution. Then, we provide an analysis showing that as the CTRs become more steep, and the bidder dominance approaches 0, the competitive ratio approaches 1.
Recall that OS is the set of bidders contributing positive revenue to OP TSP , p = |OS| and the optimal single price is vp.
Define the average clickability of bidders in OS as
and the bidder dominance
where µmax is the largest clickability of bidders in OS. The smallest value of αSP with p bidders in the optimal single price solution is 1/p, when all bidders have the same clickability. (Note that this bidder dominance depends both on bidders' values (which are implicitly present in αSP through p), and the clickabilities of the bidders in OS.) Define a second bidder dominance parameter
Observe that since the θ are decreasing, αSP ≤ α SP , with equality when all the θi are equal. We prove that the mechanism below achieves near optimal revenue as αSP → 0, and the slot clickabilities decrease steeply enough. The competitive ratio also shows that the revenue is always greater than 1 4 when at least two items are sold.
Mechanism MSP 1. Partition bidders independently and uniformly at random into two subsets S1 and S2.
2. Compute R1 = OP TSP (S1)− and R2 = OP TSP (S2)+ .
SP on the bidders in S2, and P rof itExtract R 2 SP with the bidders in S1.
We prove the following theorem about this mechanism (the proof is included in the Appendix):
Theorem 9. MSP is truthful, and has competitive ratio
against OP TSP when αSP ≤ 1/2, where
, and g(x) is defined in (5) from the Appendix.
The first term in the max, roughly in words, is the product of three values. The first is the largest ad clickability divided by the average ad clickability. The second is the average slot clickability, divided by the average slot clickability of a portion of the largest slot clickabilities (at least the half largest). Finally, the last value is at least 1/4 and approaches 1/2 as the bidder dominance decreases (here, bidder dominance is measured by ad-clickabilities and is assumed to be at most 1/2).
To understand why decreasing clickabilities is advantageous, consider a weighted price solution with two bidders. Each is capable of contributing the same amount to the optimum solution. We could place them in arbitrary positions and still obtain the same optimal revenue. However, in the optimum solution the one placed in the highest position contributes more. Now suppose they have been divided into two bins, (a.k.a. the first step of the random sampling auction). Each bidder can now potentially contribute as much as the highest contributor to revenue, even though its true contribution in the optimum is actually much less. This is the intuition behind our improved analysis.
AN AUCTION COMPETITIVE AGAINST MULTIPLE BENCHMARKS
In this section, we describe a mechanism with high revenue guarantees against both the single price and weighted price benchmarks. To do this, we use the two random-sampling auctions from §4 that have high competitive ratio against OP TSP and OP TW P respectively. We combine these two auctions to derive a single auction with a Nash equilibrium that raises revenue at least that raised by each of the individual random-sampling auctions.
As we saw in §3, for a particular set of values and clickabilities (vi, µi), either the optimum weighted price revenue OP TW P or optimum single price revenue OP TSP could be larger. However, which of the two is actually larger cannot be determined without knowing the true values of the bidders.
Here, we describe a new mechanism that builds on the two auctions in §4 to raise a larger amount of revenue. Of course, we can combine the two auctions using randomization into a single truthful auction that raises expected revenue 1 2 (OP TSP /βSP +OP TW P /βW P ). To achieve a revenue that is the better of the two auctions, we break from truthful mechanism design and instead design an auction with equilibria (which we show always exist) such that the revenue raised is at least the larger of the revenues that would be raised by the auctions MW P and MSP . The resulting equilibrium analysis framework for the random sampling approach is more robust and malleable. Our hope is that this additional flexibility will have implications for other contexts and applications as well.
We point out that the revelation principle does not apply in our setting; also, bidding truthfully is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy (we will say later for which bidders it is not an equilibrium strategy).
Mechanism MC 1. Partition the bidders randomly into two sets A and B, announce the partition, and collect bids from all bidders. Further, if bidders bid their true value whenever bidding truthfully belongs to the set of utility maximizing strategies, every Nash equilibrium of MC has this property.
Compute R
Proof. Assume wlog that R
. First we will show existence. We consider the following cases:
, only one of the two auctions can raise the revenue R B * from bidders in A. Then bi = vi is a Nash equilibrium for the combined auction: every bidder who does not win an item has no incentive to deviate from bi = vi, since his utility is 0 for all bi ≤ vi, and can only be nonpositive if he reports a bid bi > vi. Every bidder who wins an item has no incentive to deviate: if he reports bi ≤ vi, his utility cannot increase, since he either fails to win an item, or wins an item but still pays a price independent of his bid. This Nash equilibrium raises revenue R B * , since every bidder in B reports his true value.
• Case II: R can be extracted using both single price and weighted price mechanisms from bidders in A. We will show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which B is the losing partition, and bids are as specified below.
First, note that for all bidders (in both partitions) who do not win an item in either solution, there is no incentive to deviate from bi = vi, using the same reasoning as above. Since the bidders in B lose, the mechanism tries to extract revenue R B * from the bidders in A.
For the same reason, every bidder who can win an item in only one of OP TSP or OP TW P has no incentive to deviate from bi = vi. This leaves us with bidders who might win an item in both OP TSP and OP TW P . We consider two sub-cases for bidders with such values, based on the following condition:
Condition C: There is no bidder with higher utility in OP TW P who can unilaterally decrease his bid enough to ensure that P rof itExtractSP fails to extract R B * , while still winning an item in OP TW P .
-Condition C holds: In this case, bi = vi is an equilibrium vector of bids. A bidder winning an item in both OP TW P and OP TSP has no incentive to bid bi > vi; if he reports bi < vi, he might fail to win an item in OP TSP , which still extracts revenue R B * by assumption.
-Condition C does not hold (i.e., there is at least one bidder with higher utility in OP TW P who can unilaterally decrease his bid enough to ensure that P rof itExtractSP fails to extract R B * while still winning an item in OP TW P .) Let w * be the single weighted price at which P rof itExtractW P extracts revenue R B * from the bidders in A. Let i be a bidder satisfying the condition above. Then the vector of bids with bi = w * /µi for any one bidder satisfying this condition, and bi = vi for all other bidders is a Nash equilibrium: there is no incentive for i to change his bid because bi is the lowest bid at which i still can win an item in OP TW P ; by assumption this bid is low enough to ensure that P rof itExtractSP fails to raise R B * . Further, bidder i cannot increase his utility by deviating from this value, nor can any other bidder improve its utility by deviation. Note that bidder i can be any single bidder that causes the condition to be violated.
Therefore, in either subcase, there is a Nash equilibrium in which B is the losing partition, and that extracts the specified revenue.
We now prove the second part of the theorem. If bidders bid their true value whenever bidding truthfully belongs to the set of utility maximizing strategies, bidders in the losing partition always bid their true value. Therefore, the only Nash equilibria are those where B is the losing partition, in which case a revenue of R B * is extracted. So every Nash equilibrium of MC extracts the specified revenue. W P )), which is greater equal max(RW P , RSP ). Taking the expectation over random partitions, we see that the expected revenue from MC is max(βpOP TSP , βrOP TW P ). (Note that MC is actually stronger, since we obtain the larger revenue of MW P and MSP for every partition, not just in expectation over partitions.)
A natural question is whether such a situation, where a bidder prefers one mechanism to the other, and can indeed make the other mechanism fail to raise revenue can indeed exist. Also, can the natural opposite mechanism not be tried then-is it possible to have a situation where there are both bidders who prefer W P and who prefer SP , and both can make the other mechanism fail?
The following example will show that this can indeed happen, and help understand why the mechanism is not truthful. We give an example with two bidders where, given the revenue to be raised by the weighted price and single price auctions, each bidders prefers a different auction, and further, is able to make the other mechanism fail, i.e., unable to raise the required revenue.
Suppose v1 = 1, v2 = 2, µ1 = 2, µ2 = 1, and θi = 1. For these values, OP TW P = 4, OP TSP = 3, so both auctions can raise a revenue of 3. To raise this revenue using the weighted price mechanism, bidder 1's price is 1.5/2 = 3/4, and his utility is 2(1 − 3/4) = 1/2. Bidder 2 is charged a price of 1.5, and his utility is 1(2 − 1.5) = 1/2. When the single price mechanism is used, both bidders are charged a price of 1, and their utilities are 2 * (1 − 1) = 0, and 1 * (2 − 1) = 1 respectively. Thus bidder 1 has higher utility when the revenue of 3 is raised using weighted price, and bidder 2 has higher utility under single price. Further, if bidder 1 bid 3/4 instead of her true utility of 1, the single price mechanism can no longer raise the revenue of 3, while weighted price still can; similarly, if bidder 2 bids 1 instead of her true utility of 2, the weighted price mechanism can no longer raise a revenue of 3, while single price still raises the required revenue. Thus each bidder has a bid different from her true value that can improve her utility given that the other bidder bids her true value.
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we discuss our simulation results. We draw bidder valuations from a lognormal distribution with increasing variance and unit mean. This distribution has been used previously [8] and also fits the distribution observed in practice. For our simulations, we used n = 50 bidders, k = 12 slots, and ad-clickabilities µi proportional to vi. Each point plotted in a figure is obtained by averaging over 800 draws of bidder valuations from a lognormal distribution of the corresponding variance and unit mean. We use two sets of vectors for the slot clickabilities θ. We call slot clickabilities with θi = 0.7
i Geometric Slot-clickabilities. This distribution for slot clickabilites is in keeping with [9] . When several advertisements are shown at the top of the page and others shown along the right hand side, the slot clickabilities tend to be significantly larger for advertisements shown along the top. To model this situation, we use a set of Sharp Geometric Slot-clickabilities, where the first four slots (presumably shown along the top), decrease by a factor of .85, starting from .85, and the remaining slots along the east, starting from .4, decrease by a factor of .4. We also point out that because ad-clickabilities have the same ordering as the bid values, due to Theorem 2, the revenue of a Nash equlibria using Mechanism MC equals the revenue extracted using Mechanism MSP . algorithms achieve the revenue of the optimal multi-price solution. Initially, the variance of the bids is small, and the VCG auction outperforms the combined auction. As the variance in the bid values begin to diverge more sharply, the combined mechanism outperforms VCG.
VCG revenue decreases dramatically because as the bid values become more varied and every individual's bid value more distinctive, the externalities a bidder imposes on others decreases (because externalities measure, to some degree, how 'replaceable' a bidder is). We can also consider highly varied bid values as a less competitive market. If a single bidder's value lies far away from others, it does not have to fight other contenders off for his position: it is clear who the winners should be and there is not much competition for the clicks.
It is often difficult to design incentive compatible auctions for markets with little competition. Truthful auctions rely on bids other than bi to set values for bidder i. When there is a lot of variance in the bids, choosing a reasonable price is more challenging. This can be seen by observing Figure  3 . The multiprice optimum shoots up, relative to both algorithms, as the bidder variance increases. This suggests that both algorithms have difficulty obtaining revenue in these situations. The simulations corroborate the findings in Theorem 6, which prove analytically that the tighter the range of bidder vales, the higher the performance guarantee.
Since the combined mechanism is designed to do well in a worst case setting, it is not surprising that its performance improves relative to VCG exactly when maintaining a minimal amount of revenue in the face of a challenging situation (i.e.non-competitive market) is encountered. Figures 1 and 2 highlight how the steepness of slot-clickaiblities impacts the algorithms' revenues. There is very little difference in the curve for the VCG mechanism when the slot clickabilities are steeper. However, the improvement for the combined mechanism is more noticeable, outperforming VCG earlier and by a larger margin. This is consistent with our analysis, which indicates that the auction will perform better as the steepness in slot clickabilities increases.
Our simulations use the algorithms described in §4 and §5, but the auctioneer could alternatively implement a variation of the combined auction where the partition splits into two sets of equal size, chosen uniformly at random. In practice, this algorithm maintains an equilibrium (and truthfulness where appropriate). Although more cumbersome to analyze, it is a more appropriate algorithm in to use in practice and leads to a slight increase in performance. Revenue versus Variance Including OP TMP
FUTURE WORK
There are a number of interesting questions that remain open. First, is whether it is possible to design truthful auctions that achieve better guarantees (i.e., better competitive ratios, an impossibility result, or the larger revenue of the MSP and MW P ). Another question is whether it is possible to perform competitive analysis using random sampling optimal price, along the lines of [10, 4] .
One possible direction for future work is to compare the performance of these auctions against other benchmarks. Perhaps we can theoretically bound the revenue in our auction against VCG revenue, or against the best VCG revenue obtained by artificially limiting the supply as in [13] . Another possible benchmark would be to compare against the optimal revenue auction from Myerson [20] given noisy information about bidder valuations.
A considerable obstacle in achieving good bounds for keyword search problems is that the performance relies on having a large scale problem where no individual bidder has too much influence on the optimum solution. If there are many auctions with similar properties, it is possible that they could be used either to merge markets together so that the competitive ratio approaches optimal more quickly, or to use advertisers and bidders for one set of keywords to determine solutions for other sets of keywords.
Finally, it would be interesting to set reserve prices using the auctions presented here. 
APPENDIX
First we give the two extensions of P rof itExtract used in MW P and MSP .
If there are at least K bidders with bid bi ≥ w/µi, assign slot j to the bidder with clickability µ i(j) for j = 1, . . . , k, and return this allocation and w.
If K = 0, all bidders lose.
Lemma 1. P rof itExtract R W P is truthful, and extracts revenue R if R ≤ OP TW P (S), and 0 otherwise.
We note that arbitrarily allocating winning bidders to slots can also be used for the same results; we use this for consistency with the P rof itExtractSP . A. COMPETITIVE RATIO OF MW P Theorem 11. MW P is truthful, and has competitive ratio βW P =θ r g(αW P )θ r/2 with respect to OP T 2 W P , where g(αW P ) ≥ 1/4, and g(αW P ) → 1/2 as αW P → 0.
P rof itExtract
Proof. The revenues R1 (resp. R2) to be extracted and the number of slots k are independent of the bids of bidders in S2 (resp. S1). Since P rof itExtractW P with independent parameters is truthful, MW P is truthful in this case. The addition and subtraction of ensures R1 = R2. Combined with Lemma 1, the revenue from this auction is RW P = min(R1, R2), exactly one side of the partition wins, and we do not oversell advertisement slots. Since is chosen to be very small compared to the precision of the revenue, we ignore it in the analysis that follows.
Observe that R1 is greater equal the optimal weighted price revenue from bidders in S1 ∩OW . So we need only consider partitioning the bidders in OW to bound the revenue. If |S1 ∩OW | = i, and |S2 ∩OW | = r−i, then R1 ≥ wriθi, and R2 ≥ wr(r − i)θr−i, where wr = vrµr is the contribution of each bidder in OP TW P . So we have
where the second line follows since iθ r/2 ≤ iθi = Θi for all i ≤ r/2 . Define, for x ≤ 1/2,
Thus, the competitive ratio isθ
as stated.
B. COMPETITIVE RATIO OF MSP
Theorem 12. MSP is truthful, and has competitive ratio
, and g(x) is as in (5) .
Proof. Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 11, MSP is truthful, and the revenue extracted is min(R1, R2) (and exactly one side of the partition wins). Again, we ignore in the analysis since it is negligibly small.
Let r = (r1, . . . , rn), where ri is the revenue contributed by bidder i to OP TSP . Observe that R1 ≥ i∈S 1 ∩O S ri : every bidder in S1 ∩ OS has value greater equal vp, and is assigned to a slot with θj greater equal his assignment in OP TSP (the same argument holds for R2). So it is enough to consider bidders in OS, and bound
To do this we will apply Lemma 3 to a vector r with m = 1/α SP non-zero entries of value rmax = θ1µmax each, where r is obtained by repeatedly applying Redistribute 
However, this analysis does not account for the fact while computing the optimum single price revenues on each side, the winning bidders are associated with clickthrough rates greater equal those in OP TSP . Next we obtain another bound accounting for this; the final competitive ratio is the better of the two bounds.
For any partition of the bidders, assume wlog that the sum of clickabilities of bidders from OS is smaller in the partition S1, and let
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2. Let X = |OS ∩ S1|. The optimal single price revenue from this subset of the bidders is R1 ≥ vp 
where now the only term that depends on the random partition is δ. The single price optimal revenue is bounded as OP TSP ≤ vpµmaxpθp = γpvpμθp.
So the expected revenue from this mechanism is min(R1, R2) OP TSP ≥
where
We bound E[δ] using Lemma 3 as we did above, to obtain min(R1, R2) OP TSP ≥ g(αp)
θ p(γ− 1 2 ) γ γθp .
Combining the two results in (6) and (9), and using γ = αp, we have the theorem. Now we state and prove Lemma 3. Let b = (b1, . . . , bn) be a vector of nonnegative numbers. For i, j with bi ≥ bj, and any ∆ with 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ bj, define b = Redistribute(b, i, j, ∆) to be the vector with b i = bi + ∆, b j = bj − ∆, and b m = bm for m = i, j. Define R(b) = E(min( i∈S 1 bi, i∈S 2 bi)), where each bi is independently thrown into S1 or S2 with probability 1/2 (i.e., R(b) is the expected value over random partitions of the sum of entries in the smaller partition). Proof. Let S0 = {1, . . . , n}. Consider the set Smin of all subsets with the lesser sum for the given vector b, i.e., Smin = {S ⊂ S0| j∈S bj ≤ j∈S 0 −S bj}. Given i and j, the indices of the bids in the Redistribute operation, partition the sets in Smin into four sets as S b i b j = {S ∈ Smin|bi, bj ∈ S}, Sb ibj = {S ∈ Smin|bi, bj∈S}, S b ibj = {S ∈ Smin|bi ∈ S, bj∈S}; Sb i b j = {S ∈ Smin|bi∈S, bj ∈ S}.
Let pS denote the probability of a particular set S ∈ Smin being the subset in the random partition with the smaller value (note that choosing S is the same as choosing the partition of the bids bi). Let us write |S| b = i∈S bi, and |b| = But this difference is clearly positive: since bj ≤ bi, for every set S ∈ S b ibj , there is a set S ∈ Sb i b j obtained by swapping bi with bj; also p S = pS. So pS, and the lemma is proved.
